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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
STATE DECISIONS ON PEACEFUL PICKETING
I
INTRODUCTION
NTIL recently the word "picketing" has borne a connotation
of illegality. As late as 1921 the Supreme Court of the
United States refused to recognize that there might be such a
thing as peaceful and legal "picketing" even while it allowed a
union to station "representatives" at places of ingress or egress
about an industrial plant.' But the growing jealousy with which the
Supreme Court has viewed the fundamental rights secured to the
people by the Constitution of the United States has led the Court
to a re-examination of the position formerly taken with respect to
the legality of "picketing." By the year 1937, the Supreme Court
was able to speak of peaceful picketing with perfect equanimity.2
In the early forties an identification of peaceful picketing with
"free speech" was established.3 At the same time the court recog-
nized that picketing was subject to some regulation by the states
in the reasonable exercise of their police powers.'
The first of the series of cases identifying peaceful picketing
with free speech was Thornhill v. Alabama! In that case the Su-
preme Court struck down a state penal statute forbidding any pub-
lication of the facts of a labor dispute in the vicinity of the business
involved. The petitioner had been found guilty of violating the
statute by loitering and picketing near the place of business of a
I American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921).
2 Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
3 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) ; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106
(1940) ; Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U. S. 287 (1941) ; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941) ;
Carpenters & Joiners Union of America. Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 72
(1942) ; Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769 (1942).
4 See Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802
v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 776 (1942).
'310 U. S. 88 (1940).
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company engaged in a labor dispute with a union to which the
petitioner belonged. The court held that the dissemination of the
facts of a labor dispute was within the area of free discussion
guaranteed by the constitution and could be abridged only where
there was a clear danger of substantive evil; and that danger of
injury to an industrial concern did not justify a sweeping statute
forbidding peaceful picketing. Nevertheless, the court did recog-
nize that a state might set the limits of permissible contest open
to industrial combatants so long as such limits did not impair the
effective exercise of the right to discuss industrial disputes freely
and publicly.!
Upon the authority of the Thornhill case the Supreme Court
in Carlson v. California' held invalid, as an unreasonable infringe-
ment of free speech, a municipal ordinance prohibiting loitering
and peaceful picketing in the vicinity of any business for the pur-
pose of inducing anyone to refrain from trading with or working
for the business.
The following year in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.' the court had before it
an injunction forbidding all picketing, based upon a finding of
such force and violence enmeshed with picketing that even peace-
ful picketing, if allowed to continue, would operate as a continuing
threat of violence. The injunction was upheld, the court distin-
guishing the Thornhill and Carlson cases upon the ground that the
prohibition of picketing in those cases was not based upon such a
finding of violence but was a sweeping prohibition of picketing
in all circumstances. While upholding the injunction, the court
observed that mere isolated acts of violence in the past, not so
great as to make peaceful picketing a continuing threat of violence,
could not be punished by a prohibition of peaceful picketing.!
The Supreme Court refused to sanction the prohibition of picket-
Id. at 104.
7 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
8 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
9 Id. at 293.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ing in a peaceable manner merely because there was no employer.
employee relation between the parties in American Federation of
Labor v. Swing."0 The Court declared that a state could not limit
the right of free speech so as to forbid picketing except where
there was an employer-employee relation between the parties.
In Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohi" the Supreme
Court held that peaceful, truthful, secondary picketing was entitled
to the protection accorded free speech. The picketing, though done
at retail stores selling products handled by non-union peddler
drivers, was intended to persuade the peddlers to observe union
regulations, was truthful, and was not directed at the entire trade
of the retailers, but only at the specific goods handled by the
peddlers. The union had a strong self interest in stopping the
growth of the peddler system, and if it were forbidden to picket
at the retail stores, it had no effective means of striking at the
wholesale bakeries introducing this system. These facts were all
considered by the court, and the decision was seemingly made
dependent upon the presence of such justification.
That the Court did not intend to give blanket approval to all sec-
ondary picketing was indicated in Carpenter and Joiners Union v.
Ritter's Cafe." The Supreme Court there upheld an injunction pro-
hibiting picketing of a restaurant owned by one who had con-
tracted with a non-union building contractor for the construction
of a building apparently not intended to be used in the business,
and which was a mile and a half from the restaurant. The court
seemed to consider the only labor dispute to be one between the
contractor and the union, and found no industrial connection be-
tween the contractor and the restaurant. In upholding the injunc-
tion the court declared that a state could limit peaceful industrial
warfare to the particular industry involved in the labor dispute.
A general policy may be discerned when the Thornhill, Carlson
Meadowmoor, Swing, Wohl, and Ritter's Cafe cases are considered
10 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
11 315 U. S. 769 (1942).
12 315 U. S.722 (1942).
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together. The Supreme Court has established peaceful picketing
as an aspect of free speech, and therefore such picketing may not
be subjected to sweeping limitations or prohibitions by the states.
Notwithstanding the enunciation of this doctrine, the court has
recognized that peaceful picketing is also something more than
mere speech, and is subject to some restrictions by the states in the
exercise of their police powers. Where picketing is so inextricably
enmeshed with violence that the continuation of even peaceful
picketing would act as a continuing threat of violence, all picket-
ing may be prohibited. The states may not prohibit picketing where
there is no employer-employee relation between the parties for
that reason alone, but may restrict industrial strife to the industry
in which the dispute arose.
These six decisions have clothed peaceful picketing with the
constitutional protection accorded free speech, although allowing
the states to make some restrictions. The United States Supreme
Court has thus become the final arbiter of the validity of any
regulation or restraint upon peaceful picketing, as any challenge
to such restrictions will be based upon the constitutional guaranty
of free speech.
Since 1942 few state decisions bearing on this important field
of labor relations have been appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court, and there has been no appreciable elucidation of
Supreme Court doctrine. It is here proposed to review the recent
state decisions upon peaceful picketing and, where possible, to
give some indication of the Supreme Court's attitude toward the
restrictions upon peaceful picketing involved.
II
VIOLENT, INTIMIDATING AND UNTRUTHFUL PICKETING
A number of recent state decisions have been concerned with
the legality of picketing when such action was accompanied by
force, violence, or false statements. Generally, they have regarded
the Meadozvmoor case as a clear recognition of a state's power to
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2
prohibit the use of foice or vioience or the threat thereof, and as
permitting prohibition of all picketing, even peaceful, where it
may act as a continuing threat of force or violence.''
Other cases, while recognizing the rule of the Meadowmoor
case, have found the evidence of a continuing threat growing out
of past violence to be insufficient to justify a prohibition of all
picketing."' In those instances wherein the courts have found past
violence and a threatened continuation of such acts, but have not
found that peaceful picketing unaccompanied by violence would
act as a continuing threat, they have enjoined the violent acts but
have allowed peaceful picketing to continue.
The state courts have repeatedly held that mass picketing comes
within the rule laid down by the Meadownzoor case.'" In reliance
upon that case they have limited the number and location of
International Assn. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 213, A. F. of L
v. Sharp, 202 S. A'. (2d) 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Local Union No. 858 of Hotel &
Restaurant Employees International Alliance v. Jiannas, 200 S. W. (2d) 763 (Ark.
19471 ; Euclid Candy Co. v. International Longshoremen & Warehousefmen's Union,
Local 1-6. 49 Cal. App. t2d) 137, 121 P. i2d) 91 (1942). Compare Maywood Farms Co.
v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, 316 111. App. 47, 43 N. E. (2d) 700
(1942), uith Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753,
313 Ill. App. 24, 38 N. E. (2d) 972 (1942) ; cf. Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128 of
Oil Workers International Union, 19 Cal. 12d 676. 123 P. (2d) 20 (1942).
14 Rowe Transfer & Storage Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Lo,,a]
Union No. 621, A. F. L., 209 S. W. (2d) 35 (Tenn. 1948); Local Union No. 3871,
United Steel Workers of America v. Fortner. 42 S. E. (2d) (34 Ga. 1947 ; United
States Electrical Motors, Inc., v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of
America. 166 P. (2d) 921 (Cal. Superior Ct. 1946) ; Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation
v. United Steelworkers of America (CIO), 353 Pa. 420, 45 A. 12d) 857 t19461 ; May-
wood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, 313 Ill. App. 24. 38 N. E.
(2d) 972 (19421 ; Isolantite. Inc., v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of
America, 132 N. J. Eq. 613, 29 A. (2d) 183 (Ct. Err. and App. 1942) ; Ellingsen v. Milk
Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, 377 I11. 76, 35 N. F. (2d) 349 (19411;
cf. Hotel & Restaurant Employees International Alliance, Local No. 199.v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 437 (19421 semble, afl'g 236 Wis. 329, 294
N. W. 632, 295 N. W. 634 (1941) ; Chapman v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 631, 172 S. W.
(2d) 228 (1943) semble; Book Tower Garage, Inc., v. Local No. 145, International
Union, United Automobile Workers of America, 295 Mich. 580, 295 N. W. 320 (1940).
Ic Allen Bradley Local No. 111, United Electrical. Radio & Machine Workers of
America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740 (1942) ; Westing-
house Electric Corporation v. United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of Amer-
ica, Local No. 410, 139 N. J. Eq. 97, 49 A. (2d) 896 (Ct. of Err. and App. 1946) ; United
States Electrical Motors v. United Electrical. Radio and Machine Workers of America,
166 P. (2d) 921 (Cal. Superior Ct. 1946) ; General Electric Co. v. United Electrical
Radio & Machine Workers of America, 67 N. E. (2d) 798 (Ct. of Comm. P1. Ohio 1946).
1948] STATE DECISIONS ON PEACEFUL PICKETING 59
pickets, even where there is little or no history of violence con-
nected with the picketing. The state courts have found that the
presence of large numbers of pickets operates as a threat of vio-
lence toward non-striking employees and people dealing with the
picketed employer. The Supreme Court allowed an injunction pro-
hibiting all picketing in the Meadowmoor case, where even peace-
ful picketing would operate as a continuing threat of violence, and
the state courts have reasoned that mass picketing also operates
as a continuing threat of violence, which may be prohibited.
Restraints upon violence and force connected with peaceful
picketing, leaving the picketing party free to picket in a peaceable
manner, are clearly a legitimate exercise of the power of the states
to preserve the peace and to protect persons and property. Such
restraints do not infringe upon the consitutional guaranty of free
speech in any manner, inasmuch as peaceful picketing may con-
tinue.
Limitations of numbers and location of pickets in cases of mass
picketing also seem justifiable. Such regulations restrict the free
dissemination of facts concerning a dispute to some extent, but
the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and assembly
should not be allowed to destroy the right of the states to protect
its citizens from force and violence, or the threat thereof."
Within the past decade several state courts have prohibited
picketing with signs or banners bearing the usual "unfair"
slogans, 7 and one court went so far as to specify the exact words
the picketing party might use on its signs." But in Cafeteria Emz-
ployees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos " the United States Supreme
2e Cf. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184
(1921).
1" Dinny & Robbins, Inc., v. Davis, 290 N. Y. 101, 48 N. E. (2d) 280 (1943) ; Magill
Bros. v. Building Service Employees International Union, 20 Cal. (2d) 506, 127 P. (2d)
542 (1942) semble; Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128 of Oil Workers International
Union, 19 Cal. (2d) 676, 123 P. (2d) 20 (1942) ; Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, 23-S Wis. 379, 299 N. W.
31 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 668 (1942).
2s Dinny & Robbins, Inc., v. Davis, 290 N. Y. 101, 48 N. E. (2d 1 280 (1943).
19 320 U. S. 293 (1943).
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Court held that the use of such words as "unfair" or "fascist"
was not a falsification of facts, but mere name-calling, and could
not be enjoined. Subsequently, this decision has been recognized
by several state courts as controlling. 0
The Supreme Court of Illinois has declined to enjoin the publi-
cation of an admitted libel by a union in a labor paper, upon the
ground that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression
prohibits a previous restraint upon publication. -' It has been
argued that the publication of an actual libel by means of a picket
line should not be subject to previous restraint. The argument is
that publication of a libel, standing alone, may not be enjoined,
and therefore its combination with an admittedly lawful act, peace-
ful picketing, should not operate to make the picketing subject to
injunction.22
The courts which have enjoined picketing with banners or signs
found to be false apparently do so on the ground that a libel com-
bined with another tort subject to previous restraint may be re-
strained incidentally with that tort. But under Supreme Court
doctrine picketing is not a tort; it is an exercise of a constitutional
right. This being true, the libel is not combined with a tort when
publicized by means of a picket line, and an injunction prohibit-
ing picketing with false signs would seem to be a direct previous
restraint upon a libel.
III
STATUTES BROADLY RESTRICTING PEACEFUL PICKETING
Since the Thornhill and Carlson cases were decided a number
of state courts have passed upon the validity of statutes which
20 Park & Tilford Import Corporation v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 27 Cal. (2d) 591, 165 P. (2d) 891
(1946) ; see, Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Greenwood, 30 So. (2d) 696 (Ga. 1947);
Ex parte Blaney, 184 P. (2d) 892 (Cal. Supreme Ct. 1947).
21 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store
Employees of America, CIO, 330 Il. App. 49, 70 N. E. (2d) 75 (1946) ; accord, Emde
v. San Joaquin County Central Labor Council, 23 Cal. (2d) 146, 143 P. (2d) 20 (1943).
22 See Mr. Justice Carter, dissenting in Magill Bros. v. Building Service Employees
International Union, 20 Cal. (2d) 506, 127 P. (2d) 542, 545 (1942).
(Vol. 2
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apparently placed broad restrictions upon peaceful picketing."'
State courts are reluctant to construe a statute as unconstitutional,
and in People v. Bashaw2' and Lash v. State25 the statutes in ques-
tion were held not to prohibit peaceful picketing. These two de-
cisions recognized that peaceful picketing was not subject to such
broad restrictions as were apparently imposed by the statutes,
and consequently the acts were interpreted to prohibit only violence
and intimidation in picketing.
IV
PICKETING WITHOUT STRIKE AND SECONDARY PICKETING
The extent to which states may regulate picketing where there
is no employer-employee relation is a difficult problem which has
resulted in a diversity of state decisions. The Swing case estab-
lished that even in the absence of an employer-employee relation
the right to free speech encompassed peaceful picketing. The Wohl
case established the constitutional right of a labor union to picket
a retailer handling the products of a supplier with whom the union
had a legitimate dispute. But the Ritter's Cafe case indicated that
this did not mean that a union has a constitutional right to picket
one not having any industrial connection with either party to the
labor dispute. The result of these cases was to leave an area
marked off as definitely closed to interference by the state, an
area clearly open to state regulation, and a shadowland wherein
state regulation of picketing, by people not employed by the
picketed party, is of doubtful validity.
Soon after the decision in the Swing case a group of state de-
cisions recognized that picketing could not be enjoined merely
because the picketed employer had no dispute with his own em-
23 Ex parte Waltrip, 207 S. W. (2d) 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Lash v. State, 14 So.
(2d) 229 (Ala. 1943 : Ex parte Bell, 19 Cal. (2d) 488, 122 P. (2d) 22 (1942) ; People
v. Bashaw, 295 Mich. 503. 295 N. W. 242 (1940i ; American Federation of Labor v. Bain,
165 Or. 183, 106 P. (2d) 544 (1940).
2 295 Mich. 503. 295 N. W. 242 (1940).
- 514 So. (2d) 229 (Ala. 1943).
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ployees." But some decisions have prohibited picketing for this
reason alone, failing to look beyond the fact that such picketing
was not protected by the state anti-injunction act." Another,.- even
in the absence of a state anti-injunction act to divert attention
from the constitutional question involved, has failed to follow
the rule as laid down in the Swing case. Though the cases have not
been consistent, it is believed that the Swing case will be followed
where the point is properly presented.
Secondary picketing may be defined broadly as picketing of a
party not directly engaged in a dispute with the picketing party,
in order to bring economic pressure to bear on the person directly
disputing with the picketer.
There are at least two, and possibly three, types of secondary
picketing. The first type is sometimes called material picketing,
and was recognized as being a legal form of picketing in some
states before the Thornhill case was decided." The picketing in
21SEx parte Hunn, 207 S. Nk. (2d) 468 (Mo. 1948) : Rowe Tranfer & Storage Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 621, A. F. L., 209 S. W. (2d)
35 (Tenn. 1948) ; Peters v. Central Labor Council, 169 P. (2d) 870 (Ore. 1946) ; Local
No. 1460, Retail Clerks Union v. Peaker, 222 Ind. 209, 51 N. E. (2d) 628 (1943) ; Isolan-
tite, Inc., v. United Electrical. Radio and Machine Workers of America, 132 N. J. Eq. 613.
29 A. (2d) 183 (Ct. Err. and App. 1942' ; Feller v. Local 144, International Ladies Gar.
ment Workers Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 421, 19 A. (2d) 784 (Ct. Err. and App. 1941),
Heine's, Inc., v. Truck Drivers and Helpers Union Local No. 676, 129 N. J. Eq. 308, 19
A. (2d) 204 (Ct. Err. and App. 1941) ; The Fair, Inc., v. Retail Clerks International
Protective Assn., 157 S. W. (2d) 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) . Denver Local Union No. 13
of International Brotherhood of Teamsters of America v. Buckingham Transportation
Company, 108 Colo. 419, 118 P. (2d) 1088 (1941) : S and W Fine Foods, Inc., v. Retail
Delivery" Drivers and Salesmen's Union, Local No. 353, 11 Wash. (2d) 262, 118 P. (2d)
962 (1941) : Chrisman v. Culinary Workers Local Union No. 62, 46 Cal. App. (2d) 129,
115 P. (2d) 553 (1941) ; Culinary Workers Local Union No. 631 v. Busy Bee Cafe, Inc.,
57 Ariz. 514, 115 P. (2d) 246 (1941) ; 2063 Lawrence Ave. Building Corporation v. Van
Heck, 377 I1. 37, 35 N. E. (2d) 373 (1941) ; ci. Pezold v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workmen, 54 Cal. App. (2d) 120, 128 P. (2d) 611 (1942) ; Blanford v.
Press. Pub. Co., 286 Ky. 657, 151 S. W. (2d) 440 (1941) ; see Silkworth v. Local 575 of
American Federation of Labor, 309 Mich. 746, 16 N. W. (2d) 145 (1944).
27 Denver Milk Producers. Inc., v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, 183 P. (2d) 529 (Colo. 1947). probable
jurisdiction noted. 68 S. Ct. 158 (1947) ; Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Sales-
man's Union, 288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E. (2d) 480 (19421 semble.
2s Dallas General Drivers. Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 745 v. Oak
Cliff Baking Company, 203 S. W. (2d) 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
21 Goldfinger v. Feittuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937).
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the Wohl case is a good illustration of this type; picketing of a
subsequent handler of goods produced or transported by non-
union labor in order to discourage the sale or handling of the
non-union product.
The second type of secondary picketing, usually called true
secondary picketing, is aimed primarily at the party picketed and
is intended to injure his entire business by discouraging trade
with him as long as he handles the non-union product. This type
of picketing was almost universally condemned before the Thorn-
hill case was decided but has been allowed by some courts since
then. 0
Some state courts seem to draw the line between legal and illegal
secondary picketing at the point at which the pressure exerted
upon the picketed party ceases to be merely economic, moral, or
social, and becomes coercive, violent or intimidating.3 1 Courts tak-
ing this view do not consider the aim of picketing as controlling
or important. They decide its legality upon grounds similar to
those decisive in primary picketing, but tend to issue injunctions
prohibiting all secondary picketing where there is evidence of only
slight violence."
The Ritter's Cale case decided the legality of a prohibition of
secondary picketing by seeking an industrial connection between
the party picketed and the party engaged in the dispute with the
union. Finding no such industrial connection the Court upheld the
prohibition of picketing. This decision, while setting some bound-
30 People v. Muller. 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941) ; see Alliance Auto
Service, Inc., v. Cohen, 341 Pa. 283, 19 A. (2d) 152 (1941).
31 Compare Wagner v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union. 320 Ill. App. 341, 50 N. E. (2d)
865 (1943), Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753, 377 Ill. 76.
35 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), with Dinoffria v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters &
Chauffeurs, 331 Ill. App. 129, 72 N. E. (2d) 635 (1947). Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., v.
Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18 S. E. (2d) 841 (1942).
32 Denver Milk Producers, Inc., v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, 183 P. (2d) 529 (Colo. 1947) (alternative
holding) probable jurisdiction noted, 68 S. Ct. 158 (1947). In Dinoffria v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters & Chauffeurs, 33,1 Ill. App. 129, 72 N. E. (2d) 635 (1947), the
court apparently considered economic coercion alone, free from force or violence, suffi-
cient.
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arv to the protection accorded secondary picketing by the con-
stitutional guaranty of free speech, is of little aid in many cases.
Unless the party picketed has some industrial connection with
the dispute, the picketing party has nothing to gain by his actions.
If A is engaged in a labor dispute with B, he does not picket C, a
complete stranger to the dispute and to the parties, for even if
he succeeds in convincing C of the correctness of his position, C
cannot bring any pressure to bear upon B to accede to A's demands.
Therefore, a rule that secondary picketing may be prohibited
where the picketed party has no industrial connection with the dis-
putants is of little aid, and can only be used where the picketing
party is exerting his energies in a manner which will avail him
nothing.
If it be conceded that the effect of the picketing in the Ritter's
Cafe case could have been to force the restaurant owner to require
the building contractor to hire unicn men, or to force him to
break the contract with the building contractor, then it is obvious
that there was an industrial connection between the cafe and the
contractor. The rule of the case becomes then, not that secondary
picketing may be prohibited where there is no industrial connec-
tion between the picketed party and the disputants, but that it may
be prohibited where the person picketed is in an entirely different
industry from that in which the dispute arose. The rule in this
form is possibly more useful, but it is still vague and difficult to
apply.
Some cases decided soon after the Meadowmoor and Swing
cases33 seemed to interpret those decisions as forbidding any more
stringent restriction upon secondary picketing than upon primary
picketing. Two of these decisions allowing picketing where the
33 Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 296 N. Y. 26. 69 N. E. (2d) 233 (1946)
Mason& Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18 S. E. (2d) 841 (1942) ; People v.
Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941) ; Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers
Union, Local 753, 377 Ill. 76, 35 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941) ; Lora Lee Dress Co. v. Inter-
national Ladies Garment Workers Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 368, 19 A. (2d) 659 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1941).
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party picketed was a final consumer of the non-union goods." This
had been unlawful, previous to the Thornhill decision, even in
those states allowing material picketing." It would seem that the
courts of these states could forbid such secondary picketing at the
present, in view of the field left open to state regulation by the
more useful of the two possible constructions of the Ritter's Cafe
case.
Secondary picketing has been restrained in few instances since
the Swing and Wohl cases were decided, and the courts have
usually followed the lead of the Ritter's Cafe case and looked for
an industrial connection between the party picketed and the dis-
putants. In the cases involving the picketing of retail stores han-
dling products of a concern engaged in a dispute with the union
(material picketing), there have been few injunctions issued, and
those only where the signs carried declared the retailer to be
unfair, or where the picketing was enmeshed with violence. But
one recent Illinois case,36 reversing the position taken by earlier
decisions following the Meadowmoor and Wohl cases, held that a
secondary boycott, effectuated by threatening a supplier with a
strike if he continued to deal with plaintiff, was illegal and could
be prohibited though the only threat was of a peaceful strike.
Though there was no picketing involved, the decision must be
viewed as limiting the right to peacefully picket, for it prohibits
a strike and a prohibition of a strike encompasses peaceful
picketing.
As is to be expected, there have been dicta in most of the cases
dealing with secondary picketing to the effect that if there were
no industrial relation between the picketed party and the dis-
putants an injunction would issue. But there has been no case
enjoining picketing expressly on that ground since the Ritter's
34 Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 296 N. Y. 26, 69 N. E. (2d) 233 (1946);
People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281,36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941).
35 Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937).
36 Dinoffria v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters & Chauffeurs, 331 IlL App.
129, 72 N. E. (2d) 635 (1947).
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Cafe case. There have also been dicta to the effect that if the court
had before it true secondary picketing aimed primarily at the
picketed party's entire business, it might be enjoined.
State statutes broadly prohibiting secondary strikes, boycotts,
and picketing have been struck down as unconstitutional in sev-
eral recent cases."7 But one case has construed an anti-injunction
act, defining "labor disputes" as including only disputes between
an employer and his employees, as a prohibition of all other types
of labor activity, and has enjoined peaceful secondary picketing
of an employer industrially connected with the dispute.'
Generally secondary picketing has constitutional immunity from
restriction as long as it it peaceful, but some cases have not recog-
nized the constitutional question involved and have arrived at a
different result. The limitation placed upon constitutional pro-
tection of secondary picketing by the Ritter Cafe case has often
been recognized but is not clear in its application.
V
PICKETING FOR UNLAWFUL OBJECT
The common law dies hard, even in the face of Supreme Court
doctrine establishing the protection of peaceful picketing as one
facet of free speech. Some courts have applied a test to determine
the legality of picketing which may be called the "unlawful ob-
ject" test. If the purpose of picketing is to persuade or coerce
someone to do an act which is unlawful, these courts restrain, or
uphold restrictions upon, peaceful picketing. The persuasion or
coercion of anyone to do an act which subjects him to contractual
or tort liability, as well as persuasion or coercion to commit a
s7 Ex parte Blaney, 184 P. (2d) 892 (Calif. Supreme Ct. 1947) ; Alabama State Fed-
eration of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So. (2d) 810 (1944), certiorari dismissed
325 U. S. 450 (1945).
So Denver Milk Producers, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers' Union, 183 P. (2d) 529 (Colo. 1947) ; probable juris-
diction noted, 68 S. Ct. 158 (1947).
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violation of penal laws, is held to be for an unlawful purpose.
Where the purpose of picketing is to obtain a benefit for the union,
but the end sought will be of little value to the union in comparison
to the injury inflicted upon the picketed party, these courts hold
that the picketing is for an unlawful purpose and may be re-
strained.3"
Picketing for Closed Shop
Since 1940 the majority of cases dealing with picketing for a
closed shop have found no common law or statutory prohibition
of such a purpose. ° Accordingly, injunctions have been denied.
In these cases the courts have indicated that the picketing is pro-
tected from state interference by the constitutional guaranty of
free speech. In Massachusetts, however, picketing for a closed
shop is regarded as a tort and is not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment." This result was reached although peaceful picket-
ing and the closed shop contract voluntary entered into, taken
singly, are la-ful.
Two recent cases illustrate how constitutional question may lurk
in the background of labor disputes without being decided. In one
a statute was interpreted not to prohibit a closed shop contract,
nor picketing for such a purpose, and thus the constitutional ques.
tion was not raised." In the other a state statute was construed to
39 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARCAINING § 114. (1940).
") Hotel & Restaurant Einployees v. Greenwood, 30 So. (2d) 696 (Ala. 1947) Peters
v. Central Labor Council. 169 P. (2d) 870 (Ore. 1946) ; Local "'o. 1460, Retail ClerksUnion v. Peaker, 222 1d. 209, 51 N. E. (2d) 628 (1943) ; Feller v. Local 144. Interna-
tional Ladies Garment Workers Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 421, 19 A. (2d) 784 (Ct. Err. &App. 1941); Heine's, Inc. v. Truck Drivers and Helpers' Union, Local No. 676, 129
N. J. Eq. 308, 19 A. (2d) 204 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941) ; Denver Local Union No. 13 of
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs. Stablemen and Helpers of America
v. Buckingham Transportation Company, 108 Colo. 419, 118 P. (2d) 1088 (1941) ; S and
W Fine Foods, Inc. v. Retail Delivery Drivers and Salesmen's Union, Local No. 353, 11Wash, 262, 118 P. (2d) 962 (1941) : Culinary Workers Local Union No. 631 v. Busy Bee
Cafe, Inc., 57 Ariz. 514, 115 P. (2d) 246 (1941) ; cf. James V. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.(2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944).
41 Colonial Press. Inc. v. Ellis, 74 N. E. (2d) I (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1947) ; Fashion-
craft v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N. E. (2d) 1 (1943).
42 Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Greenwood, 30 So. (2d) 696 (Ala. 1947).
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ban the closed shop and to make picketing for such a purpose
unlawful and subject to injunction.' A dissenting opinion pointed
out that the majority opinion ignores the constitutional aspects of
the problem.
Picketing and other labor activity to obtain or enforce a closed
shop contract, carried on by a union which refuses to open its
membership to all competent workers, is in reality an attempt by a
few men to gain a private monopoly of the employment offered by
a company. Such activities have been enjoined as being for an
unlawful purpose." This holding seems to rest upon a firm com-
mon-law foundation, the policy against monopoly. In view of the
recognition by the Supreme Court of the power of the states to
impose reasonable restrictions upon picketing, this limitation on
union activities should be upheld.
There is hazard in attempting to predict the attitude of the
Supreme Court when the question of the constitutionality of a pro-
hibition of picketing for a closed shop reaches it. None of its
decisions have indicated directly that such a prohibition would be
constitutional. 5 But all have recognized that a state may restrict
and limit picketing in the exercise of its police power so long as
the restrictions are directed at a substantive evil. Whether a closed
shop contract, requiring workers opposed to unions to join or be
cut off from their employment, is such a substantive evil has not
been decided by the Supreme Court.
4- Denver Milk Producers, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, 183 P. (2d) 529 (Colo. 1947), probable juris-
diction noted, 68 S. Ct. 158 (1947). In American Federation of Labor v. American Sash
and Door Co., 189 P. (2d) 912 (Ariz. 1948) and State v. Whitaker, 45 S. E. (2d) 860
(N. C. 1947) the courts found closed shop contracts declared void and against public
policy by statute, but the effect of the statutes on peaceful picketing for a closed shop
was not clearly stated.
44 Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. (2d) 746, 155 P. (2d) 343 (1945).
45 Cf. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Milk and Ice Cream Drivers and
Dairy Employees Union, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N. W. 31 (1944), cert. denied 316 U. S. 668
(1942).
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Picketing to Cause Breach of Contract
At common law picketing was regarded as a tortious activity
which was subject to injunction. Where the picketing was intended
to cause breach of contract between an employer and his em-
ployees or a union, an added ground for injunction was found.
Inasmuch as peaceful picketing is now constitutionally protected,
one may doubt that a state has power to prohibit the activity on
the simple ground of inducement to breach a contract.
Since the identification of free speech and peaceful picketing
was established by the Supreme Court, few decisions' have pro-
hibited picketing solely because it was intended to bring about a
breach of contract."' There has been no Supreme Court pronounce.
ment on the question, but a memorandum decision has reversed
the grant of an injunction in a state case involving an inter-union
dispute."
Picketing to Cause an Employer to Commit an Unfair
Labor Practice
Though picketing has seldom been restricted solely because it
was intended to bring about the breach of a contract, a number of
state decisions have prohibited picketing intended to force an
employer to breach a contract with a rival union certified by the
N.L.R.B. as the proper bargaining agent for his workers. 8 If the
employer were to accede to the demands of the picketing union,
he would be guilty of a violation of the regulations of the N.L.R.B.,
46 Sterling & Welch Co. v. Duke, 67 N. E. (2d) 24 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1946) ; Crosby v.
Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N. E. (2d) 934 (1940), cert. denied 312 U. S. 690 (1941)
semble. Contra, Koss v. Continental Oil Co., 222 Ind. 224, 52 N. E. (2d) 614 (1944) ;
Blossom Dairy Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 125 W. Va. 165, 23 S. E.
(2d) 645 (1942) ; Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Everett Dist. Council of Lumber & Saw-
mill Workers, 11 Wash. (2d) 503, 119 P. (2d) 643 (1941).
47 Miller's, Inc. v. Journeymen Tailors Union, Local No. 195, 312 U. S. 658 (1941),
mem., reversing, 128 N. J. Eq. 162,15 A. (2d) 824 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940).
48 Compare, Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International Woodworkers of Amer-
ica, Local No. 46, 4 Wash. (2d) 62, 102 P. (2d) 270 (1940), and, Markham & Callow,
Inc. v. International Woodworkers of America, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union,
170 Or. 517, 135 P. (2d) 727 (1943), with Swenson v. Seattle Labor Council, 177 P.
(2d) 874 (Wash. 1947).
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as well as liable for breach of contract. These cases were decided
upon the ground that the picketing was intended to force the em-
ployer to commit an unfair labor practice, an unlawful object.
In Swenson v. Seattle Labor Council" a union was forbidden
to picket to procure a contract because a rival union had been
certified by the N.L.R.B., even though the certified union had
failed to contract with the employer. The employer would have
been guilty of an unfair labor practice if he had contracted with
the picketing union. The decision states that picketing intended
merely to persuade the employees to change their union affiliation
from a certified union to the picketing union is lawful. But the
court found that the picketing was intended to coerce the employer,
through economic injury, to bring pressure on the employees to
change their affiliation. Such coercive picketing was held not
protected by the constitutional guaranty of free speech. Opposed
to this view is another recent case declaring picketing intended
to injure the business of the employer, and thus to cause his em-
ployees to join the picketing union and desert the certified union,
to be for a lawful purpose, and constitutionally protected."'Several states have created boards similar to the N.L.R.B., for
the purpose of exercising substantially the same controls over
intra-state business that the N.L.R.B. exercises over inter-state
business.' Picketing to enforce a contract entered into by a union
which was later defeated by a rival union in an election held by
the board has been held unlawful as an attempt to coerce the
49 Compare Swenson v. Seattle Labor Council, 177 P. (2d) 873 (Wash. 1947), with
State ex rel Lumber & Sawmill Workers v. Sup. Ct. for Pierce County, 24 Wash. (2d)
314, 164 P. (2d) 662 (1945), wherein the court allowed picketing intended to persuade
a certified union, having a contract with an employer, to demand the same wages and
hours as the picketing union.
50 Compare Park and Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 27 Cal. (2d) 599, 165 P. (2d) 891(1946), with, Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Everett Dist. Council of Lumber and Sawmill
Workers, 11 Wash. (2d) 503, 119 P. (2d) 643 (1941) wherein the court refused to enjoin
picketing by one union because an employer bad entered into a contract with another
union which claimed to represent a majority of the employees. The employer was subject
to the N. L R. A., but neither union had been certified by the N. L R. B.
5
sMassachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin.
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employer into committing an unfair labor practice." For the same
reason picketing to obtain a contract with an employer who has
already contracted with a certified union has been enjoined."
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board has had a number
of its orders questioned. One such order prohibited all picketing
to force an employer to sign a closed shop contract, where less
than three-quarters of the employees had voted for the contract
in a referendum."4 The statute required a three-quarter majority
vote by the employees before a closed shop contract could be made
and provided that action to secure such a contract without a proper
vote of approval could be restrained by order of the Board. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an injunction apparently pro-
hibiting all picketing for the closed shop without the required
approval was properly issued, as the picketing was for a purpose
made unlawful by the statute.
Certiorari was denied in this case by the United States Supreme
Court, but it is possible that the injunction issued was not thought
to extend to peaceful picketing, for in an earlier Wisconsin case,."
affirmed by the Supreme Court, the statute and an injunction very
similar to this one had been construed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court as placing no restrictions upon peaceful picketing.
A subsequent Wisconsin case involving an order of the Board
held peaceful picketing to compel an employer to force his em-
ployees to join a union was for an unlawful purpose." The union's
activities were called a secondary boycott, and the order was
sustained. The case was not appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
52 R. H. White Co. v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 510,38 N. E. (2d) 685 (1942).
53 Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesman's Union, 288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E.
(2d) 480 (1942).
54 Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Milk and Ice Cream Drivers and Dairy
Employees Union, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N. W. 31 (1941), cert. denied 316 U. S. 668 (1942).
5 Hotel and Restaurant Employee's International Alliance, Local No. 122 v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board, 236 Wis. 329, 294 N. W. 632, 295 N. W. 634 (1941),
aff'd 315 U. S. 437 (1942).
56 Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 1403 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
242 Wis. 21, 6 N. W. (2d) 698 (1942).
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Picketing for Other Objects
Picketing has been held enjoinable, where the purpose was to
force an employer to pay union initiation fees for his employees.
The union did not represent any of the employees, who were in-
different as to joining the union. The picketing was not intended
to persuade the employees to join the union, nor to persuade the
employer to require his workers to join.
The purpose of the union came very close to blackmail. An
attempt was made to force the employer to pay money to buy
immunity from picketing; no effort was made to better work-
ing conditions, or increase wages, or shorten hours. The sole benefit
expected was an addition to the union's treasury and an increase
in formal membership. It seems clear that picketing for such a
purpose is beyond the protection of the right to speak freely on
matters of public interest.
Ordinarily, courts uphold contracts entered into under threat
of strike and other economic warfare, where no unlawful purpose
is sought. s In a recent case, however, a contract was set aside on
suit of a theater owner where it was entered into under duress of
a strike threat made two hours before a scheduled theater open-
ing."5 While the apparent basis of the decision was the last minute
coercion, the court also found an unlawful labor objective; to
compel the theater to hire six musicians it did not need. If a strike
under these circumstances is unlawful, it would appear that picket-
ing would be enjoined also.
The problem of union insistence on hiring of unnecessary em-
ployees has been thought sufficiently grave to merit federal legis-
lation, namely, the Lea Act.5" In a recent opinion6 the Supreme
57 Silkworth v. Local 575 of American Federation of Labor, 309 Mich. 746, 16 N. W.(2d) 145 (1944).5s Corpuz v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance, 151 P. (2d) 705
(Ariz. 1944) ; Cappy's, Inc. v. Dorgan, 313 Mass. 170, 46 N. E. (2d) 538 (1943) ; Baton
Rouge Building Trades Council v. James and Co., 10 So. (2d) 606 (1942).
59 Lafayette Dramatic Productions, Inc. v. Ferentz, 305 Mich. 193, 9 N. W. (2d) 57(1943) ; accord, Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941).
60 60 STrAT. 89 (1946), 47 U. S. C. § 506 (Supp. 194'.
81 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947'
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Court found it unnecessary to rule whether that act prohibited
peaceful picketing for hiring of superfluous employees but implied
that the validity of such a prohibition was doubtful.
It has been held that picketing to obtain a lawful labor ob-
jective, better wages, hours, or working conditions, does not fall
within the unlawful object test even though it incidentally injures
one not a party to the dispute. In Schivera v. Long Island Lighting
Co.12 the court refused to enjoin picketing of a building project
which resulted in a refusal of public utility employees to perform
the statutory duty of the utility and install gas and electrical
facilities at the request of a purchaser of one of the houses in
the project.
Injunction has likewise been refused whre picketing of an
office building resulted in a breach of a contractual ('uty of the
owner to furnish elevator service to a tenant on the eighteenth
floor who was in no way connected with the labor dispute. 3 The
number and location of pickets were set by injunction where a
union picketed a hospital for a legitimate reason, and the welfare
of the patients was threatened,"4 but the court did not prohibit all
picketing.
Thus it is seen that the courts refuse to apply the unlawful
object test to incidents which, though not the objective of the
picketing, are the foreseeable result of the picketing. This is a
healthy limitation of the doctrine; too broad application of the
unlawful object test will run afoul of the constitutional guaranty
of free speech.
VI
PICKETING THE SMALL BUSINESS MAN
The small business man who is picketed has special problems
not encountered by large concerns. Nevertheless, it appears that
62 296N.Y.26,69N.E. (2d) 233 (1946).
03 Norman v. Sullivan, 185 N. Y. Misc. 957, 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 855 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
64 Society of New York Hospital v. Hanson, 185 Misc. 937, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 91 (Sup.
Ct. 1945).
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the peaceful picketing-free speech identification applies in his
situation. In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union" a small con-
tractor who worked alongside his employees was picketed because
he refused to sign a union contract requiring him to cease such
work entirely. The United States Supreme Court sustained the
state court in denying the injunction under an anti-injunction
statute. In the course of his opinion for the Court Justice Brandeis
indicated that the picketing was an exercise of the right of free
speech.
Since 1940 state decisions have held that small business men
are as subject to constitutionally protected picketing as are their
bigger brothers. The proprietor of an apartment house, who did
his own janitor work, has been held to have no right to relief from
picketing to force him to join a union." A craftsman, who hired a
non-union helper for an hour or two a week and kept a small
workshop with the help of his wife, was picketed for failure to
hire a union man; this picketing was held to be constitutionally
protected."7 A small shopkeeper was picketed because he dis-
charged his one assistant and employed another belonging to a
rival union; the Supreme Court reversed the state court and held
that the picketing union was merely exercising its constitutional
rights. 8
It is by no means settled that the lone entrepreneur is without
remedy against peaceful picketing because of recent Supreme
Court doctrine. In the well-reasoned case of Bautista v. Jones6' the
California Supreme Court enjoined the operation, in any manner,
including peaceful picketing, of a secondary boycott against in-
dependent milk peddlers. The secondary boycott was effectuated
65 Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937) semble.
66 Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors Union, Local No. 1, 315 IU. App. 328, 43 N. E.
(2d) 198 (1942) ; O'Neill v. Building Service Employees International Union No. 6,
9 Wash. (2d) 507, 115 P. (2d) 662 (1941).
67 Friedman v. Blumberg, 342 Pa. 387, 23 A. (2d) 412 (1941).
" Miller's, Inc. v. Journeymen Tailors Union Local No. 195, 312 U. S. 658 (1941),
mem. reversing. 128 N. J. Eq. 162, 15 A. (2d) 824 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940).
69 25 Cal. (2d) 706, 155 P. (2d) 343 (1945).
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by a threatened strike against the company supplying the peddlers.
The union was not seeking to persuade the peddlers to join the
union or to observe union regulations; in fact, peddlers were
denied membership. The union was attempting to force them either
to act as jobbers employing union drivers or to cease selling milk
entirely.
The court based its prohibition of picketing on the following
grounds. The right to engage in a business is properly within the
meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While it is admitted the Fourteenth Amendment limits only the
power of the states, its substance has been adopted as a part of
California public policy protecting residents of the state. The
union's action in causing a secondary boycott of the independent
peddlers was designed to deprive them of their property, the ad-
vantageous business relations they had created, and the state has
power to prevent the confiscation or destruction of such property.
The Wohl case was distinguished as having been decided upon
the ground that a state could not define a labor dispute to exclude
a dispute between a union and a retailer selling products handled
by peddlers in the same industry as the union, merely because
Dnen of the union members were employed by the retailer. The
California court pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the Wohl
case, did not decide the validitv of a state law forbidding picketing
to force an entrepreneur who made only 35 dollars a week to hire
a union man one da- a week at a wage of nine dollars a day.
The California court also distinguished the Angelos and Swing
cases as instances of primary picketing to compel employment of
union labor and not to force the employers to quit work. The court
pointed out that the case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union"0
merely sustained a state court's refusal to grant injunction and
did not hold that a state could not prohibit picketing to force a
contractor to cease working with his hands.
70 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
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Protection of the small business man from secondary boycott
and other labor activities carried on to force him to refrain from
working with his own hands would be in the American tradition
encouraging independence, industry and initiative. The protection
given would be at little cost compared with the economic gains
made by labor in the last decade. If the reasoning advanced by
the California Supreme Court is correct, injunction would not
be in conflict with the constitutional guaranty of free speech.
VII
CALIFORNIA DECISIONS
The Supreme Court of California in two recent decisions ap-
pears to have established a well integrated body of law pertaining
to restrictions upon peaceful picketing.
lames v. Marinship Corp.,"' the earlier of these cases, held that
union activity to enforce a closed shop contract was illegal because
the union denied full and equal membership to competent Negro
workmen and failed to create an auxiliary union for Negroes hav-
ing equal rights and privileges. The court enjoined any attempt
by the union to enforce the contract, so long as it did not offer full
membership to Negroes.
Apart from the racial question presented, the case indicates
that a union which discriminates and seeks to achieve for its
present members a private monopoly of employment has no right
to picket peacefully to preserve or promote the monopoly.
The restraint upon free speech may be justified by analogizing
the restraint imposed the Ritter's Cafe case. The restriction in the
Ritter's Cafe case was held to be justified because imposed to pre-
vent undue spread of industrial controversy, a legitimate exercise
of the police power. The restriction in the Marinship case is
equally justifiable, as a reasonable protection of an individual's
right to work. As in the Ritter's Cafe case, the limitation upon free
T1 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1945).
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speech in the Marinship case is not absolute; it continues only so
long as the union remains a closed union.
In Ex parte Blaney- the California Supreme Court stated that
peaceful picketing, primary or secondary, could be prohibited
where it operates as a continuing threat of violence; where the
information disseminated is false and not mere loose language or
name calling; or where the picketing is directed against a business
having no industrial connection with the disputants. But the court
said that a state could not prohibit peaceful picketing merely
because there is no employer-employee relation between the
picketed party and the union, or because there have been isolated
acts of violence, or because the picketing is at the place of busi-
ness of a supplier or retailer of goods handled by the party dis-
puting with the union.
The California court then struck down the Hot Cargo and
Secondary Boycott Act73 as an invasion of the freedom of expres-
sion. It held that a portion of the act, not severable from other
provisions, purported to authorize injunction against any com-
bination, agreement, or act which resulted, even indirectly, in a
refusal by employees to handle goods for their employer because
of a dispute between some other employer and his employees or
a labor organization. The court stated that publication of an
employer-employee dispute, by the employees concerned, might
have such a result and could be enjoined under the act, contrary
to the entire free speech-peaceful picketing doctrine. T2e court
also decided that any form of action intended to persuade an
employer or employee not primarily engaged in the dispute to
cease dealing with the employer in the dispute could be enjoined
under the act.
In striking down the Act the court recognized that peaceful
picketing and boycott are subject to some restrictions and may be
prohibited where aimed at businesses not industrially connected
72 184 P. (2d) 892 (Calif. Supreme Ct. 1947).
'3 CALIF. LAnoR CoDE § 1135 (1937).
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with the dispute. But it was held that a state could not confine




The thorny problem of reconciliation of the constitutional right
of free speech and the power of a state to restrict labor warfare
may be expected to arise frequently in the years to come. During
the recent war labor disputes were held to a minimum through the
joint efforts of labor and management to keep production at a
high level. Concessions were made on both sides which would
have been made in peace only after an ordeal of economic strife.
The past year has seen much legislation in the field of labor
law by the states and by the United States Congress. Earlier legis-
lation remained unquestioned during the war. Many of these acts
will be tested in the courts in the near future. Many states which
have heretofore been comparatively free of quarrels between labor
and management will have an increasing amount of such litigation
because of the acceleration of industrialization brought about by
the war.
The free speech-peaceful picketing identification established at
the beginning of the war has developed into a fairly definite body
of constitutional principles. It is to be hoped that the state courts,
as new labor cases are presented, will seize upon the opportunity
to examine previously established rules and to modify and restate
them. More important than state decisions upon labor activities
will be cases decided by the United States Supreme Court which,
by its identification of free speech and peaceful picketing, has
made all state restraints subject to review on the question of in-
fringement of constitutional rights. As the boundaries of permitted
action by the states and federal government become certain, in-
dustrial strife may, to a degree, abate.
E. H. Botting.
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